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that the liquor dealer had been given a preference over other
businessmen which could not be justified under the police power
of the state. The court seemed unwilling to accord plaintiff the op-
portunity to prove that the privilege was not reasonably related to
the protection of public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
If a state legislature purported to guarantee gross profits to an
ordinary business, such legislation very likely would be invali-
dated as constituting a special privilege, as in Noble v. Davis. It
seems hard to justify a different test when such guarantee is pro.
vided for a business which exists as a matter of mere privilege.
Jim Hambright.
REAL PROPERTY
PARTITION AS AGAINST REMAINDERMAN
Arkansas. In McGee v. Hatcher' the grantor conveyed a tract
of land to his four daughters. Three of the daughters each took
a fee simple title to an undivided one-fourth interest in the land,
while the fourth daughter acquired only a life estate in the re-
maining one-fourth interest with remainder to her bodily heirs;
or if she left no bodily heirs surviving her, the remainder was
to go to her three sisters. When one of the owners of a fee simple
interest obtained a partition decree, the Arkansas Supreme Court
was faced for the first time with the question: may the owner of
an undivided interest in fee compel partition in kind where one
of the possessory interests is a life estate with contingent remain-
ders limited thereafter to unidentified persons? If there may be
partition, is it effective only for the duration of the life estate
or is it binding on the remainder interests as well?
In holding that the partition decree was valid and binding as to
the remainder interests, he court applied the following rule: when
a possessory estate for life is owned by a joint tenant or by a
tenant in common, and at least one undivided share in such land
1 Ark.-, 230 S. W. 2d 41 (1950).
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is owned in fee simple by another joint tenant or tenant in com-
mon, then such tenant has power to compel a partition of the
ownership of the land so as to bind the future interests limited
after the life estate, unless the creator of the life estate manifested
an intent by the terms of its creation, that there should be no
such power.
Arkansas thus seems to align itself with the majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions which hold that one who has an estate for life,
or in fee simple, in possession in an undivided share can ordi-
narily maintain a partition proceeding as against all the others
interested in the property, including remaindermen as well as life
tenants.2
WORDS OF LIMITATION; RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Arkansas. In Fletcher v. Ferrill3 Fletcher conveyed a tract of
land to a Masonic Lodge, reserving a life estate in himself. After
providing that the Lodge should use the land exclusively for the
benefit of a specified orphans' home, the deed read, ". . . and
when it ceases to be so used, or when said home and school shall
be moved from Batesville, Arkansas, said property shall revert
to the heirs of the said J. W. Fletcher." After Fletcher's death,
and after the Lodge ceased using the land as directed, Fletcher's
heirs claimed title under the deed.
The principal question involved in the case was whether the
word "heirs" in the deed created (a) a possibility of reverter in
Fletcher himself, so that the land would now go to his widow as
his residuary devisee, or (b) an executory limitation to Fletcher's
heirs which would become a possessory interest upon the termi-
nation of the determinable fee. The court ruled that the words in
the deed were words of limitation and not of purchase, which
created, not an executory interest in the heirs, but a possibility
of reverter. The court then held, following the majority American
rule, that a possibility of reverter is an interest which may pass
by will; hence the grantor's residuary devisee prevailed.4
2 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) § 476.
...-........ Ark -------------- 227 S. W . 2d 448 (1950).
4 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 164, Comment c, and § 165, Comments a
and f.
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The majority of the court further ruled that even if the word
"heirs" was used in the deed as a word of purchase, the land
would still go to the residuary devisee because of the Rule against
Perpetuities. Under such an interpretation the heirs of the grantor
would have an executory interest in the property throughout the
existence of the determinable fee, and, since such interest might
not vest within the period allowed by the Rule, it was declared
void. This theory was supported in a concurring opinion, which
declared the word "heirs" in the deed to be a word of purchase,
resulting in the creation of an executory interest in the heirs which
was void by the application of the Rule against Perpetuities.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Texas. In Condra v. Grogan Mfg. Co.5 the widow of the intes-
tate continued to live with the plaintiffs, a daughter's children,
on a part of the land owned by her and her husband. Immediately
after the widow's death plaintiffs orally agreed with some of the
widow's children that they (plaintiffs) should jointly own the
part of the land on which they had been living, and that the
widow's children should jointly own the remainder of the land.
Following this agreement in 1921, plaintiffs lived on and openly
used the tract in question until 1940. In 1927 the other four
parties to the partition agreement each conveyed to the defendant
an undivided one-fifth interest in the entire tract.
The Texas Supreme Court, with some modifications, sustained
the plaintiff's claim, by adverse possession, to the tract they took
under the partition agreement. The court ruled that their posses-
sion was adverse as to the other parties to the agreement, and that
conveyance by the latter of their former interests in the entire
parcel of land did not affect the operation of the statute of limi-
tations, although the purchaser had no knowledge of the oral parti-
tion agreement.
The majority of the court ruled that although the partition
agreement was not binding upon one of the parties who was in-
competent, the grantee (who acquired the incompetent's interest
5 --------- Tex ....... , 233 S. W. 2d 565 (1950).
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by guardian's deed) was charged with knowledge of the plain-
tiff's claim of absolute ownership, as vendee of the competent
parties, and no new notice was necessary. However, as to the
interest of a son's widow, who was not a party to the partition
agreement and who had been out of contact with the others, the
court held that the agreement was ineffective, and that her interest
remained unaffected by plaintiffs' possession because their acts
in the assertion of their adverse claim were not of such unequivo-
cal notoriety as to charge her with notice.
The dissenting justices, in denying that the plaintiffs acquired
title by adverse possession to the share formerly owned by the
incompetent, stated that it is unjust to hold that the vendee's
innocent purchase of an undivided interest, against which a limi-
tation claim happens to be maturing, of itself charges him with
knowledge that there is an adverse claim to every other undivided
interest in the same land, even though the statute has never started
to run against the latter.
The rule that prevails generally throughout the United States
is that the possession of land is evidence of title and is sufficient
to put a subsequent purchaser on inquiry. Every person dealing
with land is bound to take notice of an actual, open and exclusive
possession.' Inasmuch as plaintiff's possession and use was not
merely of an undivided interest in the tract but was occupation
under a claim of absolute ownership, the holding by the majority
that there was no necessity for new notice to the grantee when it
acquired each undivided interest of the entire parcel of land seems
entirely justified.
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION
Texas. In Othen v. Rosier7 plaintiff's land was so situated that
he had to cross someone's land to get to a highway. For twenty
years he had traveled over a lane across the defendant's land, and
when defendant constructed a levee to prevent surface water drain-
age, plaintiff sought enforcement of an easement and destruction
of the levee because the impounded water inundated the lane. The
6 8 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed. 1940) § 4513.
7 148 Tex. 485, 226 S. W. 2d 622 (1950).
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evidence introduced showed that both plaintiff and defendant de-
rived their title from a common source, and that the lane was used
by the defendant, as well as plaintiff, to haul wood, to permit live'
stock to get to and from a pasture, and for general farm purposes.
The Texas Supreme Court, in denying the existence of an ease-
ment by necessity, said that such an easement can arise only from
an implied grant or reservation. The fact that the claimant's land
is completely surrounded by the land of another does not, of itself,
give the former a way of necessity over the land of the latter,
where there is no privity of ownership. The facts here showed
that at the time the original owner conveyed the tract over which
the easement was sought to defendant's predecessor, he retained
the land now owned by the plaintiff and an adjoining tract over
which he could reach the highway. Consequently, there could be
no implied reservation of an easement because there was no neces-
sity for one at the time of the severance of the two estates.
The plaintiff's claim of an easement by prescription was likeL
wise defeated, the court basing its holding on the rule requiring
as an important essential to the acquisition of a prescriptive right
that the use of the easement be adverse! There is no doubt that
this rule prevails generally throughout the United States, but therd
is a very definite split of authority as to the interpretation of thd
words "adverse use." The user by another of a way or space laid
out or left by the landowner, concurrently with its user by 'the
latter, has occasionally been regarded as being presumably by
permission of the landowner.9 But whether such user is permissive
would seem properly to be determinable with reference to all the
circumstances of the case, more particularly the character and
location of the way and the place of passage. The fact that thd-
owner of the land also passes in the same place would not seenm
in itself sufficient to show that the user is permissive.' The result-
reached in the Othen case seems proper, but the mere fact that
the defendant used the lane also would not appear to be, of itself,
8 Weber v. Chaney, 5 S. W. 2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) er. ref.; Callan v. Walters,
190 S. W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
9 Sassman v. Collins, 115 S. W. 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) er. ref.
10 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1196a.
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decisive. An accumulation of factors-defendant's maintenance
of the lane for purposes of travel; defendant's knowledge that the
lane's location provided the plaintiff with an extremely convenient
means of passage between his land and the highway; the circum-
stance that the defendant, though he knew the plaintiff was using
the lane, did not attempt to exercise his right to prevent such use;
the maintenance of a gate and fences enclosing the lane by defend-
ant-all considered together, seem to justify the result that plain-
tiff's user was pursuant to license only.
Melvin R. Stidham.
UNDERGROUND WATER-THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATION
New Mexico. The State of New Mexico brought suits to enjoin
three defendants from using water drawn through wells on their
land from the Roswell Artesian Basin to irrigate the same land.1
The suits were brought pursuant to an act of the New Mexico
Legislature which declared the water in the basin to be public
property, subject to appropriation for beneficial use, after appli-
cation for use and approval thereof by the State Engineer.' The
principal issue raised was whether the act was violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
in that it authorized the State to deprive its citizens of property
without due process of law. Defendants asserted that the water
under their land belonged to them by virtue of the common law
or under the doctrine of correlative rights.
The question was raised in an earlier case in New Mexico, Yeo
v. Tweedy,"' where it was held that the title to the water belonged
to the public, and that such had always been the law in the state,
by virtue of custom and necessity. The decision explained that
although the State had adopted the common law, it was adopted
only in so far as it satisfied the needs of the area, and that for this
reason the doctrine of appropriation of water to beneficial use
applied instead of common law doctrine.
11 State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, - N. M .------------ 225 P. 2d 1007 (1950).
12 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 77-1101 et seq.
1334 N. M. 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930).
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In the instant case the decision was placed upon an entirely
different ground. The court stated that the case of California-
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.14 was appli-
cable, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the federal Desert Land Act15 severed title to all non-navigable
waters on land granted under the act and vested title in the state
or territory for the benefit of the public, to be disposed of under
the laws of the respective states or territories. The conclusion
reached in the Supreme Court case was that the non-navigable
waters are subject to the plenary control of the state or territory.
Since that case did not involve underground water, it was nec-
essary for the New Mexico court in the instant case to construe
the Desert Land Act to determine ownership of the underground
water. The applicable portion of the act reads as follows: "...
the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply
upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be
held free for the appropriation and use of the public. . . ." (Italics
added.) The court concluded that by these words Congress con-
templated all water which might be used for irrigation, which
would include underground sources of water.
Other holdings by the court on issues raised by the defendants
involving the validity and construction of the New Mexico act
were: court adjudication of the boundaries of the underground
reservoirs is not necessary for jurisdiction of the State Engineer
to attach; no right to the use of the water may be obtained by user,
the statutory method being exclusive; and the State Engineer's
power to find boundaries of reservoirs and to pass upon applica-
tions for water is not an unconstitutional delegation of power.
While it appears that under the reasoning of the earlier decision
in Yeo v. Tweedy the court might have later found some vested
rights in underground water incident to land ownership, it seems
clear after the decision in this case that all rights in water which
may be used for irrigational purposes are subject to the declara-
tions of the New Mexico Legislature.
14 295 U. S. 142 (1935).
. 19 STAT. 377 (1877), 43 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 321 et seq.
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REINJECTION OF SALT WATER-RIGHTS OF ADJOINING
LANDOWNERS
Oklahoma. In the case of West Edmond Salt Water Disposal
Association v. Rosecrans16 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
that the Disposal Association might not be enjoined and was not
liable in damages to plaintiff, an adjoining landowner, for the in-
jection of salt water into a stratum which was already saturated
with salt water, where the water injected migrated through the
stratum and under the land of plaintiff but caused no actual dam-
age to the land or rights of plaintiff.
Defendant was an association of oil companies which were
producing in the West Edmond Field. They secured permission
from the owner of a forty-acre tract to use an abandoned well on
his property as a means of injecting salt water into a sub-surface
stratum known to contain nothing but salt water. In this suit plain-
tiff, who owned the land immediately east of the land being used
by defendant, sought ejectment of defendant from plantiff's land,
an injunction to prohibit a continuing trespass, judgment for
mesne profits accruing to defendant, damages for injury to his land,
and exemplary damages. Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of
actual damage to his land, thus leaving three causes of action and
the request for exemplary damages. Defendant admitted liability
for actual damage to plaintiff's land, if any had resulted, but
denied all other liability.
The court interpreted the plantiff's claims as being based on the
assumption that the water injected into the stratum remained the
property of defendant after it migrated from the bounds of the
tract on which it was injected, and that therefore defendant had
taken the land of plaintiff and was using it as a storage reservoir
for its water. On this assumption plaintiff contended that he was
entitled to ejectment and judgment for the profits accruing to de-
fendant from the use of the land.
The court held that the defendant was not storing water on the
land of plaintiff, because title to the water was lost when it left
the bounds of the tract used by defendant. The court concluded
16 -..-------. Okla ------------- 226 P. 2d 965 (1950), app. dism'd, 340 U. S. 924 (1951).
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that since the act of defendant was lawful and did not damage
plaintiff's property or take property or deprive him of any rights
in connection therewith, plaintiff could not maintain any of the
causes of action asserted.
This decision is based on solid authority since it turns upon the
majority view as to ownership of percolating water, which has
been stated as follows:
"When percolating waters escape and go into land, or come into an-
other's control, or reach a natural channel, whatever rights the owner
of the land from which they passed may have had in them, because
in his land, are ordinarily lost.' 117
The result is consistent with the needs of the oil industry, but
does not deprive the adjacent landowner of any remedy which he
might have for actual damages, since the court examined and
clearly distinguished the line of cases in which such acts caused
actual damage.
JUDICIAL SALE OF LAND AFFECTED BY A FUTURE INTEREST
Oklahoma. Whitten v. Whitten"s was an action to quiet title to
land, and in the alternative for partition. The grantor of the tract
conveyed a life estate to plaintiff with remainder to the heirs of
her body. At a later date grantor conveyed her remaining interest
to the life tenant. The court held, reversing the trial court, that the
first deed created a contingent remainder in the children of the
life tenant (plaintiff), and that the second deed conveyed the
reversion to the life tenant, but did not affect the contingent re-
mainder. 9 Thereafter the court stated its views on the power to
order judicial sale of the entire interest in a tract of land where
title, as here, is subject to contingent interests. Although this point
was apparently not before the court, it was stated as a guide to
the trial court on remand for a new trial, since in her petition
plaintiff sought partition in the alternative in the event that the
court found that she did not have the full fee simple interest.
17 3 TIFFANY, LAW OF R&4L PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 746.
18 ........... Okla ------------, 219 P. 2d 228 (1950).
19 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 41.
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After stating that there may be no partition in kind between a
life tenant and an owner of a remainder interest, the court laid
down the requisites for judicial sale of the land. The conclusion
reached may be best stated by the following quotation from the
opinion:
"It appearing from the record that the interests of those who take
by way of remainder, the unborn as well as those living, are properly
represented; and it further appearing that the requisite accord between
the parties appears from the record, it follows that a judgment for
the sale of the entire ownership in the land in each case for the purpose
of reinvestment, in whole or in part, would be authorized and proper
upon showing being made to the satisfaction of the court that such
sale would be beneficial.."20
In another part of the opinion the court stated that the proceeds
of the sale must be treated in the same manner as the land would
have been, with respect to the various interests therein.
By the majority view, the requisites for judicial sale of land
affecting future interests are: the sale must be necessary for the
preservation of some interest in the property, and probably must
be beneficial to the interest of unborn persons or minors; all ascer-
tainable living persons must consent to the sale; the court must
have jurisdiction of all possible parties; and proceeds from the
sale must be substituted for the land.2 The opinion of the court
is in harmony with this view except where it requires only that
the sale must be beneficial, without any requirement that there be
a necessity for the sale. It may be argued that the requirement
only that the sale be beneficial to all interests is preferable, since
as a practical matter the failure to make a beneficial sale will
prevent the parties from deriving the maximum benefit from their
estate, but such an action would seem to be a substantial encroach-
ment on property rights of the unascertained persons.
Jack Titus.
20 219 P. 2d at 233.
213 Sisrms, THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS (1936) §§ 792, 793.
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